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INTRODUCTION* 
 The Supreme Court signaled a major shift in Confrontation Clause analysis in 2004, with 
its decision in Crawford v. Washington, which effectively overruled the Ohio v. Roberts 
framework.  With the focus shifting from hearsay to testimonial, the Court left many questions 
unanswered.  Of the utmost importance is the determination of whether an out-of-court statement 
is testimonial. Also, what is the status of implied assertions in this new era?  Courts have 
developed different approaches to determine whether implied assertions are hearsay; will this 
varied approach have an effect on whether implied assertions are found to be testimonial?  The 
varied approaches that have been developed to determine whether implied assertions fall within 
the scope of the hearsay rule should not be carried into the Confrontation Clause arena.  Implied 
assertions should be subject to the protections of the Confrontation Clause. 
 Part I will discuss the Confrontation Clause and how its framework has been developing 
since the Supreme Court reinterpreted it in Crawford v. Washington.  With “testimonial” now 
being the key term in Confrontation Clause analysis, there will be a brief discussion of the 
broader concept of testimony and how it relates to testimonial, as well as a discussion of 
hearsay’s continued role in the analysis. 
 Part II will analyze the different approaches court have previously taken when 
determining whether an implied assertion is hearsay.  Because a Crawford footnote stated that a 
statement is not testimonial if not offered to prove the truth of the matter that the statement 
asserts, it is important to understand how courts will determine what the statement is asserting. 
                                                     
* The author extends her sincere thanks to Professor Craig R. Callen for his invaluable insight and thoughtful 
comments. 
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 Part III examines two cases decided post-Crawford, and argues that examining an 
implied assertion for its hearsay dangers is a more appropriate way to ensure the Supreme 
Court’s goal of being “faithful to the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause.”1 
I. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right…to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”2  In 
examining the historical record, Justice Scalia found support for two inferences about the 
meaning of the Sixth Amendment and what the Framers intended it to protect.3  “First, the 
principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal 
procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”4  
The Confrontation Clause is also meant to protect against the “admission of testimonial 
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the 
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”5   
Prior to 2004, the admission of prior statements of witnesses who did not testify at trial, 
and therefore were not subject to cross-examination by the defendant, was determined according 
to the rule outlined in Ohio v. Roberts.6  Roberts held that these prior statements could be 
admitted at trial if the witness was unavailable to testify and the prior statement bore adequate 
“indicia of reliability.”7  The Court reasoned that a statement had “indicia of reliability” if the 
                                                     
1 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
3 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-50 (Justice Scalia reviewed the original intent behind the Confrontation Clause and the 
common law of hearsay). 
4 Id. at 50. 
5 Id. at 53-54. 
6 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004), and Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274-75 (2006).  See RONALD JAY ALLEN, JOSEPH J. HOFFMANN, 
DEBRA A. LIVINGSTON & WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1393 (2d ed. 2005). 
7 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.  See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 1393. 
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prior statement fell within a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception, or if the prior statement was 
supported by “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”8 
The petitioner in Crawford v. Washington urged the Supreme Court to reconsider the 
Roberts test. The petitioner asserted that the current framework did not adequately protect the 
interests that the Confrontation Clause was meant to protect.9  Commentators had argued that the 
Confrontation Clause had been reduced to an exclusionary rule for unreliable hearsay, which 
made the Clause redundant and useless as a constitutional protection.10  The Court concluded 
that the Roberts test departed from the historical principles behind the Confrontation Clause, in 
that it was both too broad and too narrow.11  Consequently, the Court established the rule that the 
Confrontation Clause bars testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial unless the 
witness is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.12  
The Court construed witness to mean anyone who makes out-of-court “testimonial” statements; 
accordingly the scope of the Confrontation Clause is determined by what is considered 
“testimonial.”13 
While the Court’s opinion in Crawford shifted the analysis to testimonial, the Court 
failed to “spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”14  In doing so, the Court 
                                                     
8 Roberts, 448 U.S., at 66.  See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 1393. 
9 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42. 
10 John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1797, 1853 (2001).  See also John 
G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the Right to Confront 
Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 203-19 (1999); Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to 
the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 557, 662 (1988).  Id.   
11 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60.  “This test departs from the historical principles identified above in two respects.  First, 
it is too broad: It applies the same mode of analysis whether or not the hearsay consists of ex parte testimony.  This 
often results in close constitutional scrutiny in cases that are far removed from the core concerns of the Clause.  At 
the same time, however, the test is too narrow:  It admits statements that do consist of ex parte testimony upon a 
mere finding of reliability.  This malleable standard often fails to protect against paradigmatic confrontation 
violations.”  Id. 
12 Id. at 59. 
13 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51). 
14 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.   
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acknowledged that its “refusal to articulate a comprehensive definition…[would] cause interim 
uncertainty.”15  However, the Court did lay a basic foundation in holding that, at a minimum, 
‘testimonial’ “applies to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a 
former trial; and to police interrogations.”16  The Court also offered three possible interpretations 
of ‘testimonial’ statements:  1) “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent,” 2) 
“formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions,” and 3) “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later 
trial.”17  Ultimately, the Court chose not to provide a precise articulation of the term 
‘testimonial.’ 
 Two years later, in Davis v. Washington, the Court made an effort to clarify ‘testimonial’ 
with regard to police interrogations.18    The Court concluded that not all statements made to 
police are testimonial.19 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation 
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.  They 
are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such 
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.20 
 
In both Crawford and Davis, the Court evaluated the statements to see if they served a 
testimonial function – “in particular, whether the statements functioned as a substitute for live 
                                                     
15 Id. at 68 n. 10. 
16 Id. at 68. 
17 Id. at 51-52. 
18 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
19 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74. 
20 Id. 
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trial testimony.”21  The meaning of testimonial is crucial to a proper analysis of what evidence 
will be admitted against a defendant.  As the framework under the testimonial approach may be 
developing somewhat haphazardly, courts must still decide cases, perhaps before they have a full 
understanding of what ‘testimonial’ means.22 
A. ‘Testimony’ 
 The Confrontation Clause is concerned with the admission of out-of-court statements in 
which witnesses bear testimony against the accused.  The text of the Confrontation Clause 
applies to “witnesses” against the accused; witnesses are those who “bear testimony” and 
“testimony” is typically a “solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact.”23  This focus suggests that not all hearsay implicates the 
Confrontation Clause’s concerns.24  In essence, an out-of-court statement must be analyzed to 
see if it is the functional equivalent of in-court testimony, and thus subject to the Confrontation 
Clause. 
The general concept of testimony underlies the issue of whether an out-of-court statement 
is serving as the equivalent of in-court testimony, therefore, an understanding of testimony 
required.25  The concept of testimony has two aspects:  “a speaker perspective and a hearer 
perspective.”26  “To testify, a speaker must intend to convey information to an audience with a 
                                                     
21 Michael S. Pardo, Testimony, 82 TUL. L. REV. 119, 171 (2007) (citing Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277, and Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 51). 
22 See Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of “Testimonial”, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 242 
(2005)(“But now that [the Supreme Court] has adopted the testimonial approach, actual cases must be decided under 
it, and many of them.  Pretty quickly, we are going to have to get a much fuller understanding of the meaning of 
‘testimonial.’”).  Id. 
23 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828). 
24 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
25 For an in-depth discussion of the epistemology if testimony, see Pardo, supra note 21. 
26 Pardo, supra note 21, at 171-72.  See Jennifer Lackey, The Nature of Testimony, 87 PAC. PHIL. Q. 177, 186-87 
(2006). 
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communicative act.”27  “Also, when the speaker intends to communicate, a hearer can take the 
content of that communicative act as testimony even when the speaker did not intend to convey 
information to that hearer.”28  The latter is the concern of the Confrontation Clause, with the 
added requirement that the testimony be given or taken for criminal prosecution.29  Michael 
Pardo suggests the following questions to help make the concept of testimony explicit and 
determine its scope:  
(1) which person’s perspective is relevant for determining whether a statement is 
testimonial: speaker, hearer, both, either; (2) whether the hearer must be a 
government agent; (3) whether the speaker must know whether the hearer is a 
government agent; and (4) whether the Court’s distinctions of present vs. past and 
emergency vs. nonemergency are coherent.30 
 
 Pardo suggests that a statement ought to be considered testimonial for confrontation 
purposes if it is testimonial from either the speaker or the hearer’s perspective.31  While Davis 
emphasized that the “primary purpose of the investigation” makes the government actor’s 
perspective relevant for the determination whether a statement is testimonial,32 “both Davis and 
Crawford emphasize that it is the declarant’s statements that are being analyzed for their 
testimonial qualities.”33  Essentially, if the speaker is intending to communicate information, and 
the statement is being either offered, by the speaker, or gathered, by the hearer, for use in a 
criminal prosecution, the statement is testimonial.   
                                                     
27 Pardo, supra note 21 at 172. See Charles W. Collier, Speech and Communication in Law and Philosophy, 12 
LEGAL THEORY 1, 2 (2006); Peter J. Graham, What is Testimony?, 47 PHIL. Q. 227 (1997). 
28 Pardo, supra note 21 at 172.  See Lackey, supra note 26, at 188.  
29 Pardo, supra note 21, at 172. 
30 Id. at 171. 
31 Id. at 172; See State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 253 (Minn. 2006) (“Whether a declarant or government 
questioner is acting, to a substantial degree, in order to produce a statement for trial is determined by asking whether 
a reasonable government questioner or declarant in the relevant situation would exhibit that purpose.”). 
32 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74. 
33 Pardo, supra note 21, at 172 (citing Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.1; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-56). 
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 Pardo addresses the relevance of the involvement of government actors in his second and 
third questions.  It is clear that the hearer need not be a government agent, in order for the 
witness’ statements to be testimonial.34  Regardless of who the hearer is, anytime a speaker bears 
testimony, meaning they intend to convey information to an audience, under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial, the statement is testimonial.35  Admittedly, the number of 
incidences in which a speaker will be conveying information to someone other than a 
government actor with the expectation that it may reasonably be used for criminal prosecution 
are few.36  Also, the speaker need not know that he is in fact communicating with a government 
agent, in order for the statement to be testimonial.37  “If a speaker is conveying information and a 
government agent is gathering the content of the speaker’s communication for use in a criminal 
prosecution, then the content is testimony.”38 
Court decisions regarding the Confrontation Clause turn on the meaning of testimonial.39  
“Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant’s right to confront a speaker who made an out-of-
                                                     
34 Id. at 174; See Richard D. Freidman, Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 553, 573 (2007).  But 
see State v. Moua Her, 750 N.W.2d 258 (Minn. 2008), vacated 129 S. Ct. 929 (2009) (“But statements made to non-
government questioners who are not acting in concert with or as agents of the government are considered 
nontestimonial. State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508, 514-15 (Minn. 2006). We hold that Vang's statements to 
family members were nontestimonial and that their admission therefore did not violate Her's right to confrontation 
under the United States Constitution.”).   
35 Pardo, supra note 21, at 174; See Freidman, supra note 34, at 573.  
36 Pardo’s example is that of a letter to a local newspaper accusing someone of a crime. 
37 Pardo, supra note 21, at 174.  But see Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exception to 
Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall Lead Them”, 82 Ind. L. J. 917, 966 (2007) (author suggests that the Supreme 
Court may define the confrontation right to require that speakers communicating with government agents know that 
the hearer is a government agent).  Id. 
38 Pardo, supra note 21, at 174.  See Friedman, supra note 34, at 573. 
39 Pardo, supra note 21, at 121 (citing Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2270, 2273-76 (2006); Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)). 
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court statement that is admitted against the defendant depends explicitly on whether the 
statement was testimonial.”40   
B. Hearsay’s Continuing Role 
 The Crawford Court made clear that the Confrontation Clause would not be left to the 
“vagaries of the rules of evidence,”41 however, hearsay continues to play an important role in the 
analysis, “[b]ecause hearsay statements usually function as a substitute for formal testimony, 
[and courts must analyze] which hearsay statements were made to serve a testimonial 
function.”42  However, it is incorrect to say that a statement is testimonial for confrontation 
purposes only if it first falls under the definition of hearsay,43 as states are free to develop their 
own rules of evidence,44 or dispose of hearsay rules altogether.  The law of evidence, as a 
statutory creation, cannot define the boundaries of a constitutional right.  Crawford recognizes 
that the previous reliance on hearsay left the Confrontation Clause ineffective to protect against 
the harms it was intended to.45 
 For Confrontation Clause purposes, testimonial hearsay is of particular concern, because 
“hearsay statements are typically not made under oath, nor subject to cross-examination, nor are 
they made in front of the fact finder, who can evaluate demeanor.”46  “The court’s opinion in 
Crawford stresses heavily that cross-examination should be the test of the ultimate evidentiary 
                                                     
40 Pardo, supra note 21, at 121 (citing Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2270, 2273-76; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52). 
41 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
42 Pardo, supra note 21, at 122. 
43 Pardo, supra note 21, at 176.   
44 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
45 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51; Pardo, supra note 21, at 177. 
46 Pardo, supra note 21, at 150 (citing Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of 
Complexity, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 367, 370 (1992)). 
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value of statements.”47  The Federal Rules of Evidence defines hearsay as any statement not 
“made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing” and “offered in evidence to prove 
the truth of the mater asserted.”48  A declarant is someone who makes a statement,49  and a 
statement can consist of either “oral or written assertion[s]” or “nonverbal conduct of a person, if 
it is intended by the person as an assertion.”50  
 In a footnote, Crawford did say that “[t]he Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial 
statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted. See Tennessee v. 
Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985).”51  Courts have interpreted this statement to mean that if 
statements are being offered for a purpose other than to prove their truth, thereby not falling 
within the definition of hearsay, they do not raise Confrontation concerns.  However, in 
Tennessee v. Street, an accomplice’s confession was admitted into evidence for comparison after 
the defendant testified that his own confession was a coerced copy of the accomplice’s.52   This 
nonhearsay purpose of comparing the two confessions did not violate the Confrontation Clause.53 
More importantly, the statement in Tennessee v. Street presented no hearsay dangers.  In 
comparing the two confessions, the factfinder was concerned with the similarities and 
differences between them, rather than the perception, memory, narration, or sincerity of the 
declarants.  Admitting a statement that is absent of hearsay dangers does not offend the 
Confrontation Clause, because cross-examination would be of limited benefit.  However, the 
                                                     
47 Craig R. Callen, An Interdisciplinary and Comparative Device for Teaching Hearsay and Confrontation, in 
INNOVATIONS IN EVIDENCE AND PROOF: INTEGRATING THEORY, RESEARCH AND TEACHING 159, 174 (Paul Roberts 
& Mike Redmayne eds., 2007). 
48 FED. R. EVID. 801(c).   
49 Id. at 801(b). 
50 Id. at 801(a).  Statements which are not hearsay are categorized at FED. R. EVID. 801(d). 
51 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9 (2004). 
52 See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985). 
53 Id. at 412-13. 
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same is not always true of statements containing implied assertions, even if not offered to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted.   
1.  Implied Assertions 
Implied assertions illustrate the danger of taking the Court’s statement at face value that 
“[t]he Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than 
establishing the truth of the matter asserted.”54   Implied assertions are statements “that imply 
(but do not explicit assert) the proposition that the proponent wishes the factfinder to draw from 
the evidence.”55  Courts have such a varied approach at determining whether implied assertions 
fall within the scope of the hearsay rule;56 this lack of uniformity should not be carried into the 
Confrontation Clause arena thereby depriving some criminal defendants of their confrontation 
rights and not others.  Additionally, the real concern in admitting statements that contain implied 
assertions is whether there are hearsay dangers present in the statement, and whether the 
evidentiary value of the statement would benefit from cross-examination.  “The fact that [the 
Court] relied solely on Tennessee v Street [when it said that a statement is not testimonial if not 
offered to prove the truth of the matter that the statement asserts] suggests that the court did not 
intend to place implied assertions beyond the reach of the Confrontation Clause.”57   
Problems arise when attempting to define the scope of a statement and what is in fact 
asserted by a given verbal act.58  “[C]onsiderable difficulty arises when the relevance of verbal 
utterances is not to prove what is explicitly asserted but rather is to prove unstated, often implied, 
propositions.”59   
                                                     
54 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9 (2004) (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)). 
55 Richard B. Kuhns, Implied Assertions and the Hearsay Rule, 16 MISS. C. L. REV. 139, 141 (1995). 
56 See Section II infra. 
57 Callen, supra note 47, at 174. 
58 Pardo, supra note 21, at 151. 
59 Id. (citing United States v. Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 1983)). 
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Examples include statements such as “I didn’t tell [the police] anything about 
you” to prove that the hearer was involved in the crime; “Nice to meet you” to 
prove that the speaker and hearer had not met previously; and a phone call making 
a bet to prove betting took place at the called location.60 
 
As we communicate through assertions, much more information is conveyed than what is 
explicitly stated.61  Further, the validity of evidence, offered as an implied assertion, depends on 
the belief of the declarant, who if not present at trial, cannot be cross-examined.62  Courts 
continue to struggle in “deciding whether to treat out-of-court statements as hearsay when 
offered to prove matters that they suggest, but do not explicitly communicate (the problem of 
‘implied assertions’).”63 
The status of implied assertions, and whether or not they are testimonial, is not clear 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Supreme Court has never decided the question, and 
lower federal courts are divided.64  The problem of implied assertions “is not small” and “shows 
no promise of going away.”65  The danger in receiving implied assertions as nonhearsay is that it  
subjects the opposing litigant to the jeopardy of an adverse litigation impact 
without the opportunity of subjecting the declarant to contemporaneous cross-
examination directed toward disproving the basis for the assertion, demonstrating 
an intended meaning of the assertion different from that suggested by the 
proponent, or in any other meaningful way ameliorating or eliminating the 
adverse impact.66 
 
                                                     
60 Pardo, supra note 21, at 151-52 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 1983); United States 
v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 857 (3d Cir. 1997), rev’d, 526 U.S. 275 (1999); United States v. Zenni, 492 F. 
Supp. 464, 465 (E.D. Ky. 1980)). 
61 See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 26 (1989). 
62 Paul F. Kirgis, Meaning, Intention, and the Hearsay Rule, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 275, 278 (2001-2002). 
63 Callen, supra note 47, at 160. 
64 Pardo, supra note 21, at 152.  “Compare United States v. Jackson, 88 F.3d 845, 848 (10th Cir. 1996) (adopting a 
broad scope in favor of admissibility), and United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1579-80 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding 
that nonassertive statements made over the phone are not hearsay and therefore admissible), with Reynolds, 715 F.2d 
at 104 (finding that even statements offered as implied assertions may be hearsay).”  Id. 
65 Mueller, supra note 46, at 413. 
66 David E. Seidelson, Implied Assertions and Federal Rule of Evidence 801: A Continuing Quandary for Federal 
Courts, 16 MISS. C. L. REV. 33 (1995). 
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These same dangers are present when statements containing implied assertions are admitted into 
evidence as nontestimonial.    
 How a court determines whether a statement containing an implied assertion is being 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted is important for both hearsay and Confrontation 
Clause analysis.  Courts that take a narrow view of the statement containing the implied 
assertion, and consider it hearsay only if offered to show the truth of a matter that it directly or 
explicitly asserts are also likely to consider the statement non-testimonial for Confrontation 
Clause purposes and admit the statement.  However, the risk of ambiguity is still present, 
because without cross-examination the party opposing the admission of the statement cannot 
demonstrate “an intended meaning of the assertion different from that suggested by the 
proponent.”67  Consequently, under this approach, statements continue to be admitted against 
defendants which deprive them of their Confrontation rights. 
II. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO IMPLIED ASSERTIONS 
 Courts have varied approaches for determining whether an implied assertion is hearsay.  
These approaches include an intent test, a literal test, and a common law test.  As courts look to 
the Crawford footnote, which asserts that “[t]he Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial 
statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted. See Tennessee v. 
Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985),”68 they are likely to continue to apply these varied approaches 
to determine whether a statement containing an implied assertion is subject to the Confrontation 
Clause.  Implied assertions should not be placed beyond the reach of the Confrontation Clause.  
Courts should adopt an approach that recognizes that the real concern in admitting statements 
that contain implied assertions is whether there are hearsay dangers present in the statement, and 
                                                     
67 Id. 
68 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9 (2004). 
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whether the evidentiary value of the statement would benefit from cross-examination.  With the 
exception of the common law test, which is not widely used, the approaches to implied assertions 
do not adequately address the concerns of the Confrontation Clause. 
A.  Intent Test 
 Some courts apply an intent test to determine whether a statement containing an implied 
assertion is hearsay.  This test “considers the statement hearsay only when the declarant intended 
to communicate the unstated, implied proposition.”69 
In United States v. Reynolds,70 the United States Postal Inspection Service was 
conducting an investigation into Parran and Reynolds who were under suspicion of stealing 
unemployment compensation checks from the mail.  After unsuccessfully attempting to cash an 
unemployment check at a bank, Reynolds was arrested.  Parran later approached Reynolds after 
his arrest, and Reynolds said to Parran, “I didn’t tell them anything about you.”71  At their joint 
trial, postal inspectors testified as to this statement, which Parran contended was inadmissible 
hearsay.72 
The court began its analysis of whether or not Reynold’s statement was hearsay by 
discussing the theory of the hearsay rule.   
The theory of the hearsay rule ... is that, when a human utterance is offered as 
evidence of the truth of the fact asserted in it, the credit of the assertor becomes 
the basis of our inference....  Thus, when an utterance is used for the truth it 
asserts, its reliability is generally considered suspect unless the declarant is 
testifying in court and available for cross-examination…because his credibility 
determines the reliability of the inferential journey one necessarily takes from the 
declarant's utterance to the ultimate fact it is alleged to reflect. Allowing a jury to 
draw inferences from an out-of-court statement admitted for the truth of a fact it 
                                                     
69 Pardo, supra note 21, at 152. 
70 715 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1983). 
71 Reynolds, 715 F.2d at 101. 
72 Id. 
14 
 
asserts when the declarant is not available for cross-examination can lead to 
inaccuracies. 73 
The court went on to explain that the potential errors in admitting an out-of-court statement 
include ambiguity, sincerity, perception and memory of the declarant.74   The declarant’s 
presence for in-court cross-examination helps to alleviate these potential errors by permitting the 
logic and inferences of the declarant to be explored in front of the jury, rather than having the 
jury project its own inferences based solely on the statement. 
The government attempted to avoid the hearsay problem by asserting that the statement 
“I didn’t tell them anything about you” was not hearsay, because it was allegedly not being 
offered for the express truth of the matter asserted, namely that Reynolds didn’t say anything 
about Parran.  Rather, the government argued, the statement was being offered to prove the 
conspiracy and joint participation in the charged offense.75  The Third Circuit didn’t accept the 
government’s narrow view of Reynolds’ statement and reasoned that 
[t]his argument ignores what legal commentators have expressly recognized and 
what the courts have implicitly recognized. That is, statements containing express 
assertions may also contain implied assertions qualifying as hearsay and 
susceptible to hearsay objections. This situation arises when the matter which the 
declarant intends to assert is different from the matter to be proved, but the matter 
asserted, if true, is circumstantial evidence of the matter to be proved. In this 
situation too, the statement is subject to a hearsay objection.76 
 
Rather than taking a sterile view of the statement, and ignoring realities of communication, the 
court aptly stated that “[a]s the government uses it, the statement's probative value depends on 
the truth of an assumed fact it implies.”77  The court recognized that the statement would not be 
useful to the government’s case, “[u]nless the trier assumes that the statement implies that 
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Reynolds did not tell the postal inspectors that Parran was involved in the conspiracy to defraud, 
even though Parran was in fact involved.”78  The court further went on to note that the admission 
of the statement was particularly prejudicial “because the defendant was unable to dispel this 
prejudice by cross-examination.”79 
In United States v. Jackson,80  a man was carjacked while talking on a pay phone.  As the 
carjacker sped away, the police were notified and they gave chase when they spotted the stolen 
car.  The carjacker eluded the police by abandoning the car and escaping on foot.  The police 
recovered a pager from inside a jacket the carjacker had abandoned during the foot chase.  
Sometime later, the pager went off; upon calling the number that was displayed, the officer heard 
a female voice say, “Is this Kenny?”  This statement was admitted at trial over the defendant’s 
hearsay objection.81  The 10th Circuit court held that the evidence was admissible because it was 
non-hearsay under Rule 801(a)(1) and (c).82  The court reasoned that: 
The question, “Is this Kenny?” cannot reasonably be construed to be an intended 
assertion, either express or implied. Were we to construe this question completely 
in Mr. Jackson's favor, it might be possible to imply that the declarant believed 
Mr. Jackson was in possession of the pager and therefore he was the person 
responding by telephone to the declarant's message. The mere fact, however, that 
the declarant conveyed a message with her question does not make the question 
hearsay.83 
 
In coming to this conclusion, the court relied on the same reasoning the D.C. Circuit used in 
United States v. Long,84 and focused on whether the declarant intended her statement to be an 
                                                     
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 105. 
80 88 F.3d 845 (10th Cir. 1996). 
81 Jackson, 88 F.3d at 846. 
82 Id. at 848. 
83 Id. 
84 United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1990).   
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assertion.85  “We find it hard to believe in this case that the declarant intended to assert that Mr. 
Jackson was in possession of the pager and that he was responding to her call.”86   
In United States v. Long,87 during the valid search of an apartment, a police officer 
answered a ringing telephone.   
An unidentified female voice asked to speak with “Keith.” The officer replied that 
Keith was busy. The caller then asked if Keith “still had any stuff.” The officer 
asked the caller what she meant, and the caller responded “a fifty.”  The officer 
said “yeah.” The caller then asked whether “Mike” could come around to pick up 
the “fifty.” Again, the officer answered yes.88 
 
Keith Long was subsequently convicted for possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute and 
contended that the phone call was inadmissible hearsay and erroneously admitted into 
evidence.89  Long contended that the declarant’s questions plainly revealed assumptions that 
were the functional equivalent of direct assertions, and the declarant “in effect asserted that 
‘Keith has crack and sells it out of [the] apartment.’ He argues that the government introduced 
this testimony to prove the truth of precisely these assertions, and that the testimony, thus, should 
have been excluded as hearsay.”90   
In upholding the admission of the phone call, the D.C. Circuit used the Advisory 
Committee’s Note91 to hold that “[t]he caller's words…cannot be characterized as an ‘assertion,’ 
even an implied one, unless the caller intended to make such an assertion.”92   
With our inquiry focused on the intent of the caller, we have little trouble 
disposing of Long's theory about implied assertions. Long has not provided any 
evidence to suggest that the caller, through her questions, intended to assert that 
he was involved in drug dealing. The caller may indeed have conveyed messages 
                                                     
85 Jackson, 88. F.3d at 848. 
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88 Long, 905 F.2d at 1579. 
89 Id. at 1574-75, 1579. 
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91 FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee’s note. 
92 Long, 905 F.2d at 1579. 
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about Long through her questions, but any such messages were merely incidental 
and not intentional.93  
 
“Because the caller's questions were nonassertive, they fall outside the scope of the hearsay rule, 
and the trial judge did not err in admitting the testimony concerning the questions.”94 
 1.  Under Crawford 
 These examples help to illustrate why it was necessary to remove the hearsay analysis 
from the Confrontation Clause.  The court attempted to determine what the declarant’s intentions 
were at the time they made the statements, in order to decide whether the statements containing 
implied assertions should be classified as hearsay.  However, as the Confrontation Clause 
recognizes, the best way to determine a declarant’s intentions is through cross-examination.  So, 
while these statements were admissible as they were non-hearsay,95 if decided today, the 
Crawford analysis would likely prohibit these statements from being admitted as they are 
testimonial. 
 In Reynolds, the defendant’s statement, “I didn’t tell them anything about you,” to his co-
conspirator, Parran, was made at the police station in the presence of the postal inspector officers 
who were investigating them.  Under these circumstances, the statement should be considered 
testimonial, as the statement was “made under circumstances which would lead an objective 
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.”96 
Whereas the hearsay analysis focused on the intent of the declarant, Davis emphasized 
that the point of view of the government actor is important to the analysis of the “primary 
                                                     
93 Id. at 1580. 
94 Long, 905 F.2d at 1580. 
95 Because these cases were decided under the Ohio v. Roberts framework, the determination that these statements 
were nonhearsay required the courts to go no further in determining whether they were subject to the Confrontation 
Clause. 
96 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 
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purpose of the investigation”,97 and under Pardo’s analysis, the statement need only be 
testimonial from either person’s perspective.98  In both Jackson and Long, the police officers’ 
primary purpose was to establish events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution of the 
suspects.  The officers answered the phone in Jackson and responded to the pager in Long with a 
mind toward gathering evidence; there was no ongoing emergency. From the officers’ 
perspective, the statements they were collecting were for use at a later trial.  Under this view 
then, the statements the officers collected were testimonial and thus subject to the Confrontation 
Clause.   
B.  Literal Test 
 Some courts apply a literal test to determine whether a statement containing an implied 
assertion is hearsay.  This test considers “the statement hearsay only when offered to prove what 
is explicitly stated and not hearsay to prove anything else.”99   
In United States v. Zenni,100 while government agents were searching the defendant’s 
premises for evidence of bookmaking activity they answered the phone several times.101    
The unknown callers stated directions for the placing of bets on various sporting 
events. The government proposes to introduce this evidence to show that the 
callers believed that the premises were used in betting operations. The existence 
of such belief tends to prove that they were so used. The defendants object on the 
ground of hearsay.102 
 
The court held that the phone calls were nonassertive verbal conduct, and the statements 
were relevant for the implied assertion that bets could be placed by calling this number.103  
“Relying on Rule 801(a) and (c) and the Advisory’s Committee Note, the court concluded that 
                                                     
97 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74. 
98 Pardo, supra note 21, at 172. 
99 Pardo, supra note 21, at 152. 
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such implied assertions were no longer hearsay, even though ‘the prevailing common law view’ 
would have treated the assertions as hearsay and excluded them.”104  The court reasoned that the 
statements were offered to show the declarants’ belief that the defendant was a bookmaker, 
rather than for the truth of the words uttered,105 and because the language is not an assertion on 
its face, it is not hearsay.106   
This approach defies the realities of communication and ignores the way in which jurors 
will interpret the statements.  David Seidelson argues that the presence of several phone calls, all 
of persons attempting to place bets, does not eliminate the possibility that the multiple declarants 
may have been mistaken about their implied assertions that the defendant was a bookmaker.107  
The Confrontation Clause was effectively circumvented under this approach, and the jury was 
permitted to entertain this evidence without the defendant having an opportunity to confront or 
cross-examine these unknown declarants. 
In United States v. Lewis,108 a police investigation revealed that Wade had attempted to 
accept a package in the mail containing a large quantity of crack cocaine;109 Lewis arrived 
shortly after the delivery and as the two men attempted to leave the house where the cocaine had 
been delivered to, they were both arrested.110  At the time of their arrest, Wade and Lewis each 
had a pager in their possession, which were seized by police.111   
Later that day, at the police station, the pager associated with Lewis began 
beeping. Officer Jerry Price called the number displayed on the pager and 
identified himself as Lewis. The person on the other end asked Price “Did you get 
                                                     
104 Seidelson, supra note 66, at 36 (footnotes omitted). 
105 Zenni at 466. 
106 Id. at 469. 
107 Seidelson, supra note 66, at 37. 
108 902 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1990). 
109 The police intercepted the package before delivering it to Wade and substituted paraffin wax for the crack 
cocaine.  Lewis, 902 F.2d at 1178. 
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the stuff?” Price answered affirmatively. The unidentified person then asked 
“Where is Dog?” Price responded that “Dog” was not available…The evidence at 
trial revealed that “Dog” is Wade's nickname.112 
 
Over the hearsay objections of Lewis and Wade, Officer Price was allowed to testify as to the 
questions asked by the unknown caller.113  The 5th Circuit held that the officer’s testimony was 
not hearsay because the unknown caller’s questions were not “statements.”114  The court 
reasoned that the questions were removed from the definition of hearsay because “like most 
questions and inquiries, …they do not, and were not intended to, assert anything.”115 
 Lewis and Wade argued, unsuccessfully, that while the questions were not direct 
assertions, there were implied assertions in the questions.  “For example, they argue that implicit 
in the question ‘Did you get the stuff?’ is an assertion that Lewis and/or Wade were expecting to 
receive some ‘stuff’.”116  The court, in relying solely on Rule 801’s definition of statement, held 
that this argument was foreclosed because implied assertions were removed from the coverage of 
the hearsay rule.117   
Is the fact that the words end in a question mark rather than a period really dispositive of 
the ‘statement’ being characterized as hearsay?118  “It seems to me that the question, ‘Did you 
get my stuff?’ is in every rational respect simply another way of asserting, ‘I want to know if you 
got the stuff.’  To attempt to distinguish between that question and that assertion is to engage in a 
fool’s errand.”119 
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Because this case was decided pre-Crawford, the court’s determination that the testimony 
was not hearsay also foreclosed any argument that the admission of the statement of a co-
conspirator violated their Sixth Amendment confrontation clause rights.120 
1.  Under Crawford 
Similar to the intent test,121 the cases decided under the literal test highlight the problems 
inherent in placing implied assertions outside the reach of the Confrontation Clause.  The 
implied assertions in the above two cases were analyzed to determine whether the words uttered 
by the declarant were “statements” and if so whether those “statements” were being offered for 
the truth of the words uttered.  By characterizing the words uttered by the unknown declarants as 
non-statements or as statements that did not assert the matterto be proven, the courts ignored the 
potential for hearsay dangers.   
The Crawford framework, with its emphasis on cross-examination, should focus on the 
hearsay dangers present in a statement.   
 Whereas the hearsay analysis focuses on whether the words uttered are a “statement” and 
whether that statement “asserts” what is trying to be proven, Crawford and Davis emphasize that 
the point of view of the government actor is important to the analysis of the “primary purpose of 
the investigation,”122 and under Pardo’s analysis, the statement need only be testimonial from 
either person’s perspective.123  In both Zenni and Lewis, the police officers’ primary purpose was 
to establish events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution of the suspects.  The officers 
answered the phone and responded to the pager with a mind toward gathering evidence; there 
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was no ongoing emergency. Under this view then, the statements the officers collected were 
testimonial and thus subject to the Confrontation Clause.   
C.  Common-Law Test 
 Today, very few courts apply a common-law test to determine whether a statement 
containing an implied assertion is hearsay.  However, this test would be most appropriate to 
determine whether a statement containing an implied assertion should be subject to the 
Confrontation Clause analysis.  This test considers “the statement hearsay when the probative 
value of the statement depends on the perception, memory, sincerity, or narration of the 
declarant.”124   
In State v. Dullard,125 police officers from the Des Moines police department went to the 
home of Brett Dullard to investigate reports of a methamphetamine lab in the home.  Dullard’s 
mother gave the officers permission to search the residence and the detached garage.126  In the 
garage, officers found numerous materials used to manufacture methamphetamine.  Also in the 
garage was a notebook containing a handwritten note from an unknown person, stating 
B - I had to go inside to pee + calm my nerves somewhat down.  When I came out 
to go get Brian I looked over to the street North of here + there sat a black + white 
w/the dude out of his car facing our own direction-no one else was with him.127 
 
Dullard was charged with possession of ephedrine with intent to use it as a precursor and with 
possession of ether with the intent to use it as a precursor. At trial, the State introduced the 
handwritten note into evidence over Dullard's hearsay objection. “The State argued the note was 
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not offered to prove the truth of the matters it asserted but to connect Dullard to the items in the 
garage used to manufacture methamphetamine.”128 
 The Iowa court of appeals found the note contained an implied proposition by the writer 
that Dullard possessed the methamphetamine materials, and determined the note was hearsay 
because it was offered to show the declarant's belief in this implied proposition, and the declarant 
was not available at trial to be cross-examined about the proposition.129 
After a lengthy discussion, the Iowa supreme court upheld the court of appeals, and 
determined that the implied assertions in the note constituted hearsay.  In so holding, the court 
focused on the hearsay dangers present in the statement.   
Four dangers are generally identified to justify the exclusion of out-of-court 
statements under the hearsay rule: erroneous memory, faulty perception, 
ambiguity, and insincerity or misrepresentation. . . . Yet, the distinction drawn 
between intended and unintended conduct or speech only implicates the danger of 
insincerity, based on the assumption that a person who lacks an intent to assert 
something also lacks an intent to misrepresent. The other “hearsay dangers,” 
however, remain viable, giving rise to the need for cross-examination. Moreover, 
even the danger of insincerity may continue to be present in those instances where 
the reliability of the direct assertion may be questioned. If the expressed assertion 
is insincere, such as a fabricated story, the implied assertion derived from the 
expressed assertion will similarly be unreliable. Implied assertions can be no more 
reliable than the predicate expressed assertion.130 
 
 1. Under Crawford 
 The reasoning expressed by the Iowa supreme court in Dullard, is an excellent 
explanation as to why implied assertions should not be placed beyond the reach of the 
Confrontation Clause.  The common-law approach recognizes that hearsay dangers may be 
present, regardless of the intent of the declarant or the literal statement.  Even though in this case 
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the statement would likely be non-testimonial, the reasoning still holds true that implied 
assertions are not free of hearsay dangers.  The note in Dullard would be non-testimonial, 
because it is relatively clear that the author of the note did not anticipate that it would be used in 
criminal prosecution.   
  III. CASES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN 
In each of the following cases, which were decided after Crawford, the defendant 
asserted that his Confrontation rights were violated by the admission of statements which 
contained implied assertions.  The analysis conducted by the Circuit courts is troublesome, as it 
appears that the defendant’s legitimate Confrontation concerns went unchecked. 
A. United States v. Cesareo-Ayala131 
Alejo Cesareo-Ayala was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine, conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine, and distribution of marijuana.132  Cesareao-Ayala appealed his convictions on 
multiple theories, including challenging the “admission into evidence of statements made to him 
by an associate who had just been apprehended and was cooperating with the police.”133  
Cesareo-Ayala asserted that the statements “were inadmissible hearsay and their use at trial 
violated the Confrontation Clause.”134 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and held that 
“the statements made by Mr. Cesareo-Ayala’s associate were not offered into evidence for the 
truth of the matter asserted, so they were not hearsay and did not implicate the Confrontation 
Clause.”135   
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1.  Background 
 At Cesareo-Ayala’s trial, the key witness against him was Charles Klepac.  As a result of 
prior dealings that Klepac had with Edward Mendez, a cocaine dealer, Klepac had agreed to 
connect Mendez with cocaine buyers.  Two buyers that Klepac connected with Mendez engaged 
in several transactions involving quantities exceeding one kilogram of cocaine.  Klepac testified 
that at six or seven of these large quantity transactions, Cesareo-Ayala was also present.  Several 
times Cesareo-Ayala handed the cocaine to Mendez, and in return Mendez handed the majority 
of the money proceeds to Cesareo-Ayala.  This lead Klepac to believe that “Cesareo-Ayala was 
Mendez’s superior and was ‘in control of the cocaine.’”136 
 When Steward, a buyer of small quantities of cocaine, was arrested, he agreed to 
cooperate with police and directed them to Klepac.  On the police’s instructions, Steward 
contacted Klepac to purchase one kilogram of cocaine.  While conducting surveillance of 
Klepac’s residence during the arranged meeting time, officers observed Mendez arrive.  Steward 
was instructed to call Klepac and tell him the deal was off; when Mendez exited the house, he 
was arrested with one kilogram of cocaine on his person.   
 Now in custody, Mendez also agreed to cooperate with the police to set up a bust of his 
supplier.  After about one hour in custody, Mendez received a call on his mobile phone.  The 
phone was in walkie-talkie mode, which permitted Officer Nunez to hear the conversation.  The 
officer contemporaneously wrote down an English translation of the conversation as follows: 
 [Mendez]: What's going on, Primo? 
 
[Cesareo-Ayala]: What happened?, Are you ready? 
 
[Mendez]: Nothing, I had trouble at the gas station[.] 
 
[Cesareo-Ayala]: Do you have my stuff? 
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[Mendez]: Yes. I've got your money. 
 
[Mendez]: Do you want to meet at 7th and Central? I need two more. 
 
[Cesareo-Ayala]: Two more. Alright. 
 
[Mendez]: Yeah, two more of the Stuff. I'll give you your stuff and you give me 
two more. 
 
[Cesareo-Ayala]: I don't like 7th and Central. 
 
[Mendez]: Well, you tell me where. I'll meet you where ever. You tell me and I'll 
be there. 
 
[Cesareo-Ayala]: Remember where we played billiards? There.. 
 
[Mendez]: Okay. How much time? 
 
[Cesareo-Ayala]: 15 minutes. 
 
[Mendez]: Okay.137 
 
Officers, along with Mendez, set out for the place identified by Mendez.  En route, Mendez 
received a second call on his mobile phone, which Officer Nunez again heard, this time 
committing it to memory and writing out the English translation approximately 30 minutes later. 
[Mendez]: What's going on? 
 
[Cesareo-Ayala]: Where are you? 
 
[Mendez]: I'm almost there; I am at the gas station. 
 
[Cesareo-Ayala]: Who do you have with you? 
 
[Mendez]: A friend I ran into at the fuel station. 
 
[Cesareo-Ayala]: Oh. I'm not there yet, I'm 7 minutes away. 
 
[Mendez]: Okay, me to[o]. I'll be pulling in right behind you then. 
 
[Cesareo-Ayala]: Okay.138 
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Conducting surveillance of the agreed upon parking lot, officers observed a man, later 
identified as Cesareo-Ayala, walk to the rear of the building with a red bag, and return minutes 
later without the bag, at which point officers arrested him.  The red bag was recovered and found 
to contain about 920 grams of marijuana.  Cesareo-Ayala was then indicted for conspiracy to 
distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, possession with 
intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, and distribution of marijuana.139   
Prior to trial, “Mendez’s attorney had indicated that Mendez would invoke his Fifth 
Amendment right to refuse to testify if called by either side as a witness.”140  Cesareo-Ayala then 
filed a motion in limine to exclude any testimony about Mendez’s statements based on the 
Confrontation Clause.141  The trial court provisionally admitted the phone conversations “subject 
to the government’s making the showing required for admission of coconspirator statements 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).”;142  the statements were admitted without the 
government ever asking the court to determine whether it had made such a showing.143 
2.  Appellate Court’s Analysis 
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Cesareo-Ayala asserted that Mendez’s statements were 
inadmissible hearsay and barred by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.144  The 
government changed tactics from asserting that the statements fell under the coconspirator 
hearsay exception, to asserting that the statements were not offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted.145  By relying on the Tennessee v. Street footnote in Crawford,146 the 
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government was able to claim that the offered statements were not hearsay and did not implicate 
the Confrontation Clause; the Tenth Circuit agreed.147 
The court proceeded in its analysis by taking each sentence uttered by Mendez separately 
and determining what that sentence asserted, if anything.148  The court, taking each sentence one 
by one, came to several conclusions: 1) that a statement asserted nothing; 2) that the admission 
of statements asserting Mendez’s location or proposed meeting time and place was harmless; and 
3) that a statement was not offered for the truth, because in fact, Mendez was lying.  These 
conclusions lead the court to conclude that the entire conversation was properly admitted. 
Cesareo-Ayala countered that Mendez’s statements  
make indirect implied assertions and were so intended by Mendez.  Comments 
such as “I’ve got your money” were intended to make the inculpatory assertion 
that the person on the other end of the telephone was engaged in a business 
transaction with Mendez.  “I need two more” is intended to assert that Mendez 
wished to have the person on the other end deliver additional drugs and that this 
was in addition to drugs delivered in the past….Mendez, knowing that law 
enforcement was listening to his conversation, was intending to make assertions 
for their benefit about the identity of the person on the telephone and the nature of 
their relationship.  It was these implicit assertions and the truth of those assertions 
which made these conversations relevant and useful to the Government’s case.149 
 
The court claimed that Cesareo-Ayala’s argument misconceived what it means to say that 
a statement is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  The court asserted that the 
conversation “helped prove that the two men had a business relationship,…without regard to the 
truth of anything that either man asserted.”150  The probative value was not the conversations 
themselves, but the fact that Cesareo-Ayala initiated the conversations and his responses to 
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Mendez.151  The court reasoned that Mendez’s portion of the conversation was included merely 
for context, and that “[i]n context, Mr. Cesareo-Ayala’s statements strongly suggest that he was 
involved in the (aborted) transaction with Steward and wanted to get together with Mendez to 
obtain the proceeds.”152  The court further went on to hold that 
[t]he role of the hearsay rule (and the related component of the right to 
confrontation) is to protect against statements that cannot be challenged by cross-
examining the speaker.  Cross-examination can expose problems with the 
speaker’s perception, memory, or truthfulness.  But Mendez’s perception, 
memory, and truthfulness were irrelevant to the purpose for which the 
government offered his statements.153 
 
3. The Jeopardy of the Court’s Decision 
 The reasoning employed in Cesareo-Ayala seems to be an attempt by the Tenth Circuit to 
again tie the Confrontation Clause to the “vagaries of the rules of evidence.”154  The statements 
of Mendez, whether offered for their truth or, as the court suggests, merely as context, were used 
to imply the guilt of Cesareo-Ayala.155  Mendez’s statements containing express assertions not 
offered for their truth, “may contain implied assertions that qualify as hearsay because the truth 
of the implied assertions is at issue and relevant to guilt.”156  In particular, the statements “Yes. 
I've got your money.”; “I need two more.”; “Yeah, two more of the Stuff. I'll give you your stuff 
and you give me two more.”,157 are circumstantial evidence of the matter to be proved, namely 
that Mendez and Cesareo-Ayala were involved in an on-going drug business, including the 
attempted cocaine transaction with Steward.  The result reached by the Tenth Circuit seems to 
bolster the argument that “[t]he fact that [the Crawford Court] relied solely on Tennessee v Street 
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in [stating that the Confrontation Clause does not bar the use of testimonial statements for 
purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted,]…suggests that the court did not 
intend to place implied assertions beyond the reach of the Confrontation Clause.”158 
 Further, because of the Crawford Court’s footnote159 which stated that the Confrontation 
Clause does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the 
truth of the matter asserted, the Tenth Circuit did not even entertain the notion that Mendez’s 
statements might be testimonial.  Mendez’s statements to Cesareo-Ayala appear to have all the 
elements of a testimonial statement.  It seems clear that Mendez, working essentially as a 
government informant, was communicating with Cesareo-Ayala in such a manner as to be useful 
for later criminal prosecution against Cesareo-Ayala.  Mendez was caught red-handed with a 
large quantity of cocaine, and likely believed that his cooperation with the police was critical to a 
more favorable disposition of his future criminal prosecution.  Mendez was aware that 
government agents were listening to his conversation, he was aware his statements were being 
memorialized by Officer Nunez, and he certainly must have been aware that the police intended 
to use his statements against Cesareo-Ayala in future criminal prosecution.   
In noting that the scope of the Confrontation Clause cannot be limited to a very formal 
category of proceedings, the Davis Court stated that “[i]n any event, we do not think it 
conceivable that the protections of the Confrontation Clause can readily be evaded by having a 
note-taking policeman recite the unsworn hearsay testimony of the declarant...”160  That is 
precisely what happened in Cesareo-Ayala, and the admission of Mendez’s statements violated 
Cesareo-Ayala’s Confrontation rights. 
                                                     
158 Callen, supra note 47, at 174. 
159 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9. 
160 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276. 
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Whereas Crawford emphasizes the import of cross-examination as the best means for 
determining reliability, the Tenth Circuit admitted Mendez’s statements “untested by the 
adversary process.”161  The process by which the Tenth Circuit determined to admit the 
statements was too analogous to the reasoning employed under the Ohio v. Roberts framework.  
Implied assertions are prone to hearsay dangers, and the Confrontation Clause aims to protect an 
accused from those dangers by affording cross-examination.  To say that a statement avoids 
Confrontation concerns if it falls outside the definition of hearsay must be incorrect, because that 
would again reduce the Confrontation Clause to an exclusionary rule based on the definition of 
hearsay, making the Clause redundant as a constitutional protection.162  To tie “testimonial” to 
the definition of hearsay would be a misstep because a constitutional right would depend on how 
broadly or narrowly courts define hearsay, rather than addressing the possible hearsay dangers 
present in the statement. 
B.  United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez163 
 Francisco Rodriguez-Lopez was charged with conspiring to distribute heroin.  Prior to 
trial, Rodriguez filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of phone calls made to his mobile 
phone and answered by the police.  The district court held that the calls were inadmissible 
hearsay and excluded the evidence, at which point the government filed an interlocutory appeal.  
The Sixth Circuit then held “that because the government did not seek to prove the truth of any 
matter asserted by the callers, the district court erred in excluding evidence of the calls.”164 
                                                     
161 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. 
162 Douglass, supra note 10. 
163 565 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2009). 
164 Rodriguez-Lopez, 565 F.3d at 313. 
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 1.  Background 
 An undercover DEA agent made arrangements to purchase heroin from Omar Robles-
Manguia in a shopping center parking lot.  While conducting surveillance, prior to the pre-
arranged meet time, agents observed a man in a pick-up truck slowly circling the parking lot.  
After Robles-Manguia completed the sale of heroin to the undercover agent, other agents moved 
in and arrested the man in the pick-up truck as he attempted to drive away.  Upon his arrest, 
Robles-Manguia told the agents that the man in the pick-up truck, Rodriguez-Lopez, had agreed 
to act as a lookout.   
 Special Agent Perryman questioned Rodriguez-Lopez, who claimed he knew nothing 
about the drug transaction.  During this interrogation, Rodriguez’s mobile phone rang repeatedly, 
and Agent Perryman answered the phone ten times.  Each time he answered the phone, Agent 
Perryman heard the caller request heroin.165   
 2.  Appellate Court’s Analysis 
 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the statements were admissible nonhearsay, because the 
government did not offer them for their truth.166  Although the records did not reveal the exact 
content of what the callers said to Agent Perryman, the court reasoned that “if the statements 
were questions or commands,167 they could not…be offered for their truth because they would 
not be assertive speech at all.  They would not assert a proposition that could be true or false.”168  
The court further concluded that even if the statements were assertions, the government was 
offering them as evidence that the calls were made, not for their truth, and ‘the fact that 
                                                     
165 Id. at 314. 
166 Id.  
167 For example, “Can I get some heroin?” or “Bring me some heroin.” 
168 Rodriguez-Lopez, 565 F.3d at 314 (citing United States v. Wright, 343 F.3d 849, 865 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[A] 
question is typically not hearsay because it does not assert the truth or falsity of a fact.”); United States v. Thomas, 
451 F.3d 543, 548 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Questions and commands generally are not intended as assertions, and therefore 
cannot constitute hearsay.” (citations omitted))).  Id. at 314-15. 
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Rodriguez received ten successive solicitations for heroin is probative circumstantial evidence of 
his involvement in a conspiracy to distribute heroin.”169 
 The district court had held that the statements contained implied assertions about the 
callers’ alleged desire to buy heroin and their belief that the defendant could supply heroin.170  
But, the court of appeals reasoned that although the calls supported an inference that Rodiguez-
Lopez was a heroin dealer, that inference did not depend on the caller’s truthfulness, memory, or 
perception.171 
 3.  The Jeopardy of the Court’s Decision 
 The implied assertions of the callers, that the defendant was a heroin dealer, were used to 
imply the guilt of Rodriguez-Lopez.  “[W]hen the matter which the declarant intends to assert is 
different from the matter to be proved, but the matter asserted, if true, is circumstantial evidence 
of the matter to be proved…the statement is subject to a hearsay objection.”172  Here, the Sixth 
Circuit should have held that the content of the phone calls was inadmissible hearsay, because 
the implied assertions present in the statements were circumstantial, if not direct, evidence of the 
matter to be proved, namely that Rodriguez-Lopez was involved in a conspiracy to distribute 
heroin.   
Also, how did the court come to the conclusion that the inference that Rodriguiez-Lopez 
was a heroin dealer did not depend on the caller-declarant’s truthfulness, memory, or perception?  
Although perhaps far-fetched, it is possible that while high, a heroin-user mistakenly wrote down 
the phone number of Rodriguez-Lopez, which was one digit different from the user’s actual 
supplier, and then shared this phone number with all of his heroin-user friends.  Confrontation 
                                                     
169 Id. at 315. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Reynolds, 715 F.2d at 103. 
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and cross-examination of the declarants was the only effective way to ensure that the evidence 
admitted against the defendant to prove his guilt is reliable. 
The Confrontation Clause problem was not raised or addressed on appeal, however, it is 
relatively safe to assume that because the Sixth Circuit held the statements to be admissible 
because they were not offered for their truth, they would have similarly held that the admission 
of the statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause like the court in Cesareo-Ayala.  This 
conclusion would be erroneous.  Davis emphasized that the point of view of the government 
actor is important to the analysis, when determining the primary purpose of the investigation.173  
Similar to both Jackson and Long, discussed supra, the police officers’ primary purpose in 
answering Rodriguez-Lopez’s phone was to establish events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.  The officer answered the phone with a mind toward gathering evidence; there was 
no ongoing emergency. The statements of the various callers requesting heroin were testimonial 
and thus subject to the Confrontation Clause.   
CONCLUSION 
To say that a statement is non-hearsay and therefore avoids the Confrontation Clause 
analysis is an oversimplification, and does not add anything meaningful to the determination of 
whether a statement is testimonial.  Crawford’s reference to Tennessee v. Street is being 
misused.  As courts continue to approach implied assertions in a variety of ways to determine 
whether or not they fall within the definition of hearsay, the same varied approach should not 
carry over into the testimonial inquiry of the Confrontation Clause analysis.  A better way to 
interpret the limitation on the Confrontation Clause is to say that the Confrontation Clause does 
not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes for which there are no hearsay dangers.  
The Court should recognize that when the truth of an implied assertion is at issue and relevant to 
                                                     
173 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74. 
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the accused’s guilt, it should be determined whether or not that statement is testimonial, so as to 
protect that person’s Confrontation rights. 
